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T he Russian Federation is one of the world's top five carbon emitters, along with China, the United States, India and the European Union. While Russia was among the initial 175 signatories to the Paris Agreement, the country has not yet ratified it.
Russia has already experienced a significant reduction in emissions with the fall of the Soviet Union, an argument it frequently utilizes despite the fact that environmental considerations were not a motivating factor. The reduction in Russia's emissions was a direct result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent economic slump that led to the collapse of its industrial sectors. Russian negotiators also repeatedly emphasize the importance of their forests, which account for approximately 19% of global forest reserves, and the positive impact they have on the remainder of the European continent by acting as a carbon sink.
These two arguments, in addition to the lack of an economic incentive, help illustrate the Russian point of view with regard to climate change mitigation: Russia has already done its part for the environment and the rest of the world needs to catch up. However, Russia has been criticized for its unambitious target, with its base year being set prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Estimates have shown that current Russian policies will lead to an increase in average annual Russian emissions, excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), of 2.65 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2020, rising to 2.9 GtCO2e in 2030 ( Figure 1) . These levels reveal a significant decrease in annual emissions when compared with 1990 levels: down by 27-29% in 2020 and by 20-25% in 2030. 1990 is the base year for the Russian INDC target. This indicates that Russia can not only easily meet its INDC target, but can also afford to increase emissions without jeopardizing its contribution.
This study assesses the political feasibility of advocating more ambitious emission reduction targets amongst Russian stakeholders. It uses KTAB to simulate collective decision-making processes to assess the expected level of support for, and reaction to, a more ambitious Russian INDC. The results of the model simulation suggest that within the current political context, it is not politically feasible to adopt policies that would enhance Russia's emissions reduction commitments. Results also suggest that this issue is not of particular importance to the Russian leadership, further decreasing the likelihood of a more ambitious target. Introduction W hile the Russian Federation was among the 175 initial signatories to the Paris Agreement in 2016, the country has yet to ratify it. Government officials have stated that Russia is not intentionally delaying ratifying the agreement, but is instead in the process of careful preparation. There is currently widespread speculation regarding the date of possible ratification.
The Russian INDC includes a target to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 70% of 1990 levels by 2030, a level higher than actual emissions in Russia for the past 20 years. Indeed, this fact is reflected in statements by the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Alexander Khloponin, that the country "has countervailed emission growth in other states and regions to a significant degree" (RussiaUN 2016). Khloponin also claimed that countervailing this growth is "an illustrative confirmation of Russia's leading role in the international climate process" (RussiaUN 2016) . This is the context in which plans are being developed, such as a national adaptation plan aimed at the sustainable management of forests and a long-term 2050 low-carbon development strategy, alluding to an increased focus on reducing emissions.
This study applies the KAPSARC Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis (KTAB), a model of collective decision-making processes (CDMPs), to conduct an analysis of Russian stakeholders. It offers insight into support for further ambitions to reduce Russia's emissions and possible enhancement of its INDC under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Fall of the Soviet Union and Subsequent Decarbonization
R ussia significantly reduced its levels of emissions with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet collapse led to an economic meltdown, with gross domestic product falling by about 40% over the remainder of the decade (Aslund 1999) . The economic collapse led to a sharp decrease in industrial production and activity, and with that, a significant reduction in GHG emissions. It has been estimated that GHG emissions in the country fell by an astonishing 51% between 1990 and 2008 (Howarth and Foxall 2012) . While that amount of decarbonization may have been an unintentional consequence, it has served Russia well in climate negotiations in the years since.
Amongst the main criticisms aimed at Russia regarding climate is the country's unambitious reduction targets, with respect to both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The targets in both instances were not only achievable with minimal effort, but they also allowed the country to continue to increase its emissions without facing the threat of missing its targets, as shown in Figure 1 . Setting the targets' base year to 1990 ensures Russia is nominally far ahead of other countries in terms of decarbonization.
Source: Climate Action Tracker 2019. 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 8 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 4 2 0 2 6 2 0 2 8 2 0 3 0 Previous Russian Experience R ussia has previous experience participating in international climate agreements, notably the Kyoto Protocol. Similar to the Paris Agreement, the process of ratifying and applying the Kyoto Protocol in Russia was protracted and extended with various delays. Initially signed in March 1999, it took more than five years for the protocol to be ultimately ratified in Russia. However, Russia is often credited with saving the protocol, as it required ratification by 55 industrialized nations that represented at least 55% of 1990 GHG emissions. Prior to Russian ratification, countries representing only 44% of worldwide GHG emissions had ratified the agreement. With the United States (U.S.) and Australia refusing to participate, this meant that Russian ratification ensured the protocol's political survival. By 2010, Russian emissions were 34% below 1990 levels, far below their Kyoto target (Astrasheuskaya 2012) .
There are two main interpretations of Russia's lingering approach toward the Kyoto Protocol. According to the experts interviewed for this study, one explanation was the lack of a clear understanding among Russian officials of its possible economic consequences, with some Russian officials describing it in unflattering terms. Alternatively, the late ratification could have been an attempt to gain a political advantage (particularly following the U.S. decision not to ratify) to increase Russian bargaining power in the international arena.
Indeed, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was viewed as a purely political measure by many observers, as President Putin announced Russia᾽s intention to ratify on the same day that the European Union ceased its objections to Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. The protocol was ratified in Russia in November 2004 and came into effect 90 days later. T urning to the Paris Agreement, while Russia has set its INDC, the country has yet to ratify the agreement. It has become clear from ministerial meetings that Russian authorities, including the Ministry of Natural Resources, have no interest in rushing the ratification process. Indeed, the prevailing position of Russian officials was to seek ratification after the agreement's procedures were finalized during the 24th Conference of the Parties in Katowice in late 2018, although this position did not hold. It was later revealed by Sergei Ivanov, the Special Representative of the President on Environmental Activities, in March 2019 that Russia would ratify the agreement "only after full accounting of forests and their ability to absorb CO2" (RIA Novosti 2019). The head of the Russian Federal Forestry Agency, Ivan Valentik, has stated that the stocktaking of forests should be completed by 2020.
Currently, the most preferred Russian mechanism for meeting its commitments under the Paris Agreement is to continue supporting projects targeted at GHG emissions reductions and increasing energy efficiency through tax cuts, tax credits and reduction factors for equipment depreciation. Russian authorities are also developing rules for GHG offset mechanisms, mainly forest projects for companies, as discussions surrounding methods of calculating absorbed emissions are still ongoing.
More ambitious modification of the Russian target has not been the focus of debate. The draft of the federal law titled "On the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions" suggested limiting GHG emissions to no more than 75% of 1990 levels and rapidly received public criticism. As stated in a letter by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) in April 2018, Russia's emissions level already amounted to 70% of 1990 levels when accounting for forest absorption. The Ministry of Economy had also openly stated that Russia's assumed levels of obligation would mean that firm restrictions on GHG emissions need not be enforced. Measures such as carbon pricing or the creation of an emissions permits market were not under serious consideration.
However, in December 2018, the Ministry of Economic Development proposed new draft legislation titled "Federal Law on State Regulation of Emissions and Absorption of Greenhouse Gases and on Amending Selected Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation." The legislation as drafted proposes giving the government power to identify which GHGs will be subject to regulation, and to establish limits on emissions and the issuance of GHG emission permits, as well as setting fees for GHG emissions. The bill is facing considerable opposition and is yet to be passed.
We now turn to an assessment, using the KTAB methodology, of the political feasibility of implementing an increasingly ambitious Russian INDC.
Reaction to the Paris Agreement K TAB is a platform that enables the modeling and analysis of CDMPs. CDMPs capture the political bargaining process, both explicit and implicit, among a set of actors -which can include individuals, institutions, constituencies and identifiable groups or 'blocs.'
In this paper we present an analysis of plausible outcomes for CDMPs relating to Russia's INDC. We used a specific instantiation of a model in KTAB, based on the Spatial Model of Politics (SMP), one of the most prominent and best-established models of CDMPs. The SMP simulates how actors interact with and influence one another over time to arrive at a 'feasible outcome' for the modeled question. This reflects a model-based view of the expected outcome for actors' collective support for -or opposition to -enhancing the Russian INDC.
Aggregate knowledge of the experts characterizes the current political landscape (referred to as turn 0), but all simulations beyond turn 0 are based purely on the KTAB SMP calculations.
We have chosen to focus on analytical results. For a detailed technical description of the underlying model and its calculations, interested readers are referred to Wise, Lester, and Efird (2015a) and Wise, Lester, and Efird (2015b) .
Both papers are freely available from KAPSARC's website and the KTAB portal, as is the program's source code and documentation. Please visit www. ktab.software for all related papers, the latest version of the software and all materials of interest related to KTAB. KTAB and the Spatial Model of Politics W hen using the KTAB methodology to analyze a CDMP, the first step is to define the modeled question. In this paper, we are evaluating the disposition of key stakeholders on the issue of enhancing the Russian INDC. This type of question lends itself well to a linear scale that can capture a range of potential support for or opposition to this issue, as shown in Figure 2 .
The spectrum depicted in Figure 2 provides the range of positions that actors can take regarding the issue. For example, actors assigned a position at or close to 50 are perceived as neutral toward the notion of implementing more ambitious carbon reducing targets. Actors holding a position of 100 are seen as fully supportive of the issue, while actors holding a position of 0 are fully opposed. Positions ranging from 0 to 50 reflect increasing opposition, and positions ranging from 50 to 100 reflect increasing support, with the degree of opposition or support dependent on the distance between an actor's position and the two extremes on the scale. It is important to emphasize that interviewed experts only provided the numerical values described in this section and that this paper does not represent their views or conclusions.
Defining the Question
In consultation with the experts, we identified a comprehensive list of actors, including policymakers, stakeholders and influencers, and obtained three specific quantitative attributes for each actor during the interviews. Those attributes are defined as:
Position: the location of an actor on the linear spectrum. In other words, what is the actor's advocacy concerning support for, or opposition to, enhancing the Russian INDC?
Influence: the relative overall degree of political power, or clout, of each actor. The most powerful actor is assigned a value of 100, and other actors are weighted relative to the most powerful actor.
Salience: the relative priority each actor assigns to the modeled questioned as compared with other issues that compete for the actor's attention.
The expert data collected were then aggregated into a single dataset, hereafter referred to as the baseline dataset. The full dataset is detailed in Table 1 of the Appendix. This table represents stakeholder data, utilizing the collective knowledge of the relevant actors, as determined by the seven experts interviewed, who also assigned values to an actor's position, influence and salience. "Exercised power" is simply the product of influence and salience divided by 100, and indicates the amount of influence an actor is willing to apply to the modeled issue.
The KTAB SMP Data Inputs I n this section, we present our analysis of the simulation results for the baseline dataset, i.e., the weighted average of the expert data. A visualization of the baseline dataset and the final simulation results are presented in Figure 3 , below. The left-hand side of the figure is a representation only of the experts' data, which describe the current landscape of actor positions and exercised power before simulating the negotiating process (turn 0). Meanwhile, the right-hand side presents the same landscape following the conclusion of the simulated negotiating process. Expert input ends after providing data for turn 0. In this case, the simulation ran for 19 negotiating turns (or rounds), reflecting a protracted and lengthy debate. During these turns actors bargained with one another in an attempt to achieve their preferred outcomes. The model continues to iterate negotiating rounds until there is a minimal change in actor positions, reaching a 'steady state' where additional turns would not appreciably change the result.
In each of the graphs in Figure 3 , the horizontal axis replicates the position spectrum described in Figure 2 , and the vertical axis represents the exercised power for each actor (calculated from an actor's influence and salience). Each of the bars in the figure represents a specific actor, and actors are color-coded according to the figure's key. The height of each bar mirrors the actor's exercised power. Note that many of the actors are stacked on top of each other -this indicates that they hold the same position (within roughly a five-point range). Thus, the overall height of the 'stack' of bars depicts the exercised power from those in a coalition advocating a particular position.
Simulation Results
Source: KAPSARC KTAB analysis. Based on the expert input depicted in Figure 3 , President Putin (the red bar), in addition to other government officials and energy companies, appears indifferent to amending Russia's current targets. Putin is clearly the final decision-maker in Russia, yet his lack of interest in the subject provides other actors with the opportunity to help shape his views on the issue. Sergei Ivanov is seen to strategically position himself conservatively, with the intention of providing room for political maneuvering in order to ultimately maintain the status quo and persuade other actors to align with the president's position.
Gazprom, one of the world's largest natural gas producers, adopts a neutral position, indicating that the company sees opportunities for financial benefit from various outcomes on this issue with little downside. For example, a Russian switch from coal to gas, if the negotiations lead to enhanced environmental targets, would be beneficial for Gazprom. However, holding a neutral position gives the impression that Gazprom is maintaining the status quo, and it would not be adversely affected if the negotiations lead to unchanged climate targets.
Toward one side of the spectrum, SUEK, one of the world's largest coal companies and a strong advocate against climate change accommodation in Russia, adopts an extremely negative position on enhancing the INDC. SUEK is known for having a long history of lobbying against policies that favor low-carbon fuels. Toward the other side, Rusal, the world's largest aluminum producer, is already planning to meet 100% of its power needs from clean energy sources by 2020. The company anticipates an economic gain from supporting the issue as it has lower-cost smelters run on hydroelectric power sources. Oleg Deripaska, the owner of Rusal and one of Russia's richest oligarchs, is a very active proponent for climate action in Russia, yet his influence has severely decreased following U.S. sanctions placed on his companies and his personal assets. He has recently dissociated himself from Rusal in an attempt to shield the company from sanctions. Rusnano, a state-owned tech company active in promoting renewable energy, and Rosatom, a state-owned nuclear energy company that is also the largest electricity generating company in Russia, hold a position very supportive of more ambitious targets for Russia.
By the end of the simulation, as shown on the right-hand side of Figure 3 , consensus builds around maintaining the current INDC, indicating that the majority of actors agree that the current target need not be meaningfully adjusted. During the simulation, coal companies, led by SUEK, actively lobbied for even less ambitious climate goals, but they were ultimately not resistant to the final consensus as it reflects business as usual and would not significantly affect their business. By the end of the simulation, the position of the RSPP indicates that the organization acknowledges climate change should be addressed, but Russian companies are not currently ready to do so given Russia's economic stagnation, in addition to U.S. sanctions targeting Russia. Thus, they join the consensus of maintaining the current targets. The two actors that stray from the consensus, Ivanov and Rosatom, are only advocating a slightly more ambitious target -indicating that they are unlikely to object to the achieved consensus.

Source: KAPSARC KTAB analysis. As shown in Figure 4 , Rosatom shifts to a more moderate position, closer to the developing consensus, during the seventh turn in response to pressure from Sergei Ivanov. SUEK also joins the moderate position occupied by Rosatom and Ivanov during the eighth turn, again following pressure from Ivanov.
The final agreed consensus, supporting the current INDC, begins to clearly form by the ninth turn, aside from Ivanov and Rosatom advocating a position in favor of a slightly more ambitious commitment. This reaffirms the inference from Figure 3 that the emerging political will in Russia supports maintaining its current climate targets. Through the bill, the government is "proposing a permit system for direct emissions of GHG; economic mechanisms to regulate emissions and absorption, including mechanisms of transfer and trading of units of emissions and absorption; and taxation privileges" (Grigoryan 2019) .
While seemingly an elementary measure when compared with its European counterparts, given that specific targets for distinct sectors are not included, the bill signifies an important step for Russia, in spite of the bill not mentioning the Paris Agreement. It would set a new legal norm within Russian legislation by "providing CO 2 and other greenhouse gases with legal status" (Sauer and Collett-White 2019) . However, as signaled by the KTAB simulation, the bill and its proposed reforms have been met with considerable opposition. The opposition has come particularly from the Russian energy ministry and the RSPP. The RSPP even introduced a distinct version of the bill excluding emissions quotas and charges for exceeding targets.
The debate has even prompted President Putin to address the issue by urging members of the RSPP congress to overcome their differences and assist in Russia's sustainable development. Despite statements from the president, observers largely expect that fierce opposition to the bill will ultimately lead to its weakening. The bill was expected to be passed in June 2019, with enforcement taking effect in 2025. However, this is yet to happen. The bill has not yet officially been sent to the government for consideration, as the Institution of Regulatory Impact Assessment is currently evaluating it. E missions in Russia have dramatically fallen following its economic shift away from Soviet-style industrial production after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, not only is it almost guaranteed that Russia will meet its INDC by 2030, but Russia may even increase its emissions while still meeting its 2030 target (Makarov, Chen and Paltsev 2017) . While there are many reasons why Russia does not want to push for a more ambitious INDC, at its core is the lack of a broad economic incentive for more ambitious targets, in addition to the lack of strong political drivers, suggesting that there is little scope for a more ambitious INDC. The general feeling in Russia is that it has already done its part for the environment in the past and that the rest of the world needs to catch up. Furthermore, Russia continues to stress that its large forests provide a major contribution by capturing carbon and acting as a carbon sink, which benefits the rest of the world (particularly Europe and Asia).
While climate change is indeed an economic and environmental concern, the domestic political context in Russia, as simulated by the KTAB methodology, indicates little support for any strengthening of Russia's current INDC. When focusing on the most influential actors in Russia, who are capable of playing a large role in steering the discourse, it is clear from the simulation that the president is not directly involved or particularly concerned about this issue. It appears that his representative on the issue, Sergei Ivanov, is firmly in the driver's position. In terms of ratifying the Paris Agreement, Ivanov has stated that full accounting of Russian forests is a prerequisite, which is expected to be completed in 2020.
Overall, the Russian government does not give much attention to the issue of climate change. This became evident in 2018 when the two of the most experienced government officials were replaced: Alexander Bedtritsky (former president of the World Meteorological Organization and former advisor to the Russian president and Russia's Special Envoy for Climate); and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, described as an expert in climate negotiations. The new advisor on climate is Ruslan Edelgeriyev, a former prime minister of the Chechen Republic who, according to experts, did not have a substantial background on climate issues when appointed. Indicative of the priority attached by the Russian government to climate issues, as of 2019 climate change is not yet the responsibility of any official Russian governmental agency.
In the past, Russia has used climate change and its participation in international treaties as a strategic bargaining chip to be played in broader geopolitical and economic relations. While there is hope for change from the recently introduced draft legislation, staunch resistance from within both government and industry have led to uncertainty. Considering climate action on its own, many believe there is little chance that Russia will prioritize more ambitious measures. Without economic incentives, such as handicaps that Russian exporters may face from not acceptably recording emissions, it is likely that little will change. However, the draft bill, which may end up being stripped back to merely establishing guidelines for reporting emissions, could very well be a slight indicator of change on the horizon. 
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